



WHAT'S UNDER THE HOOD? A NOVEL **VULNERABILITY SCANNER FOR** KERNEL DRIVERS

Members:

Kieran Chai Kai Ren, Oliver Yeow Zi Lok (NUS High School of Mathematics and Science)

Mentors:

Yap Ni (DSO National Laboratories)

Introduction to Problem

- In modern operating systems, **device drivers**^[1] are essential to facilitate communication and connections between applications and other hardware components
- Most of these drivers are developed and maintained by external vendors
- Current measures fall short of sufficiently mitigating most common vulnerabilities
- Legitimately signed drivers are completely trusted by security software
- Led to attacks where a vulnerable signed driver is installed into a target system to perform malicious actions (e.g. ransomware)

Aims of Project

- 1. Create a tool that outperforms previous state-of-the-art vulnerability scanners for WDM drivers
- 2. Find novel, previously undiscovered vulnerabilities with the scanner to improve security of third-party drivers
- 3. Optimise the scanner to improve speed of driver scanning

Important Definitions

- 1. Privilege escalation A malicious user from a low-privilege account, exploiting a vulnerability in the software to gain access to a higher privileged account
- 2. Symbolic execution Use of symbolic values for inputs in a computer program, to determine the different outcomes that can occur with different inputs
- 3. Fuzzing Executing the program in an isolated environment, and observing what inputs make it crash
- **4. Disassembly** Converting the machine code of drivers to a more
- human-readable assembly code 5. WDM/WDF framework – Frameworks used for development of Windows Kernel Drivers
- **6. IOCTL** I/O control code, allows for different **functions** to be called in a driver

Tools Used

- Angr Library used to perform symbolic execution of programs
- **Objdump** Tool used for **disassembly** of programs
- **Python** Programming language, used to write the scanner
- **Ghidra** Tool for **manual analysis** of drivers

Literature Review

- Static and dynamic verification tools have been developed by Microsoft
 - Focused on a set of specific guidelines related to the correct use of Windows APIs
- Covers a limited set on vulnerabilities
- Existing third-party tools that help with manual analysis
 - Restrictive
 - Often requires driver's source code
 - Or **specific environment** to run the driver on
- A lot of **work** is still done by the human
- **POPKORN** A previous attempt to automatically scan for these vulnerabilities Set of several functions commonly associated with vulnerabilities
 - (sink functions) symbolically analysed • Paths to the sinks **traced**, checks if the arguments supplied are
 - loaded from user-mode buffers (sources)
 - Lacks many common vulnerabilities including vulnerabilities that arise from misuse of **heap functions**
 - Unable to scan for vulnerabilities that do not call any sink functions

Methodology Find IOCTL handler **Driver** Locate the **DeviceloControl** handler • Function pointer to the IOCTL handler • If available, a simple check for [rbx+0xe0] (the offset to function Verification and setup pointer containing the handler) is done to quickly locate the dispatch handler • If not, the scanner utilizes symbolic Find relevant functions that are execution Verify driver was required for analysis later and hook them created under WDM framework Later, instead of executing the original function, the program will execute the Find IOCTL codes Checks made when the call is made to detect vulnerabilities Symbolize a generic I/O request packet Find and hook memset and memcpy seperately Step through the program starting from Check for initialization • Have to use their function signatures **DeviceloControl** • These functions are not imported in calls to **IoCreateDevice** the Windows kernel Check if the symbolic value representing the IOCTL code was constrained to a single value Scan for vulnerabilities For each IOCTL code... Multiprocessing pool is initialized with each IOCTL code being traced separately Set **breakpoints** within the program, Initialize global before and after events that will then be variables inspected for vulnerabilities Begin exploration within each branch of the program, tracking events/calls **Print out** information necessary to to hooked functions and looking for signs that indicate vulnerabilities reproduce any vulnerabilities found

Vulnerability analysis – CVE-2018-19320

- Vulnerability in driver gdrv.sys
- Caused by insecure IOCTL allowing for arbitrary memory write
- Scanner was able to rapidly discover and triage the vulnerability within 25 seconds

DbgPrint("Dest=%x,Src=%x,size=%d",puVar4,lVar5,uVar1); if (uVar1 != 0) { 1Var5 = 1Var5 - (longlong)puVar4; uVar3 = (ulonglong)uVar1; *puVar4 = puVar4[1Var5]; puVar4 = puVar4 + 1; uVar3 = uVar3 - 1;} while (uVar3 != 0); uVar2 = 1;Vulnerable code, as shown by static analysis performed in Ghidra

Reference lpInBuffer: 0000000 00000000 0000000 00000000 ARB WRITE DETECT!!! ADDRESS: <BV64 lpInBuffer[0]> USERMODE REQUIRED: set() IOCTL: 0xc3502808 RIP: 0x1400029f7

CALLSTACK: Backtrace: Frame 0: $0 \times 140001e81 => 0 \times 1400029b4$, sp = $0 \times 7ffffffffffffff88$ Frame 1: 0x0 => 0x0, sp = 0xffffffffffffffffCONSTRAINTS: Input Buffer: <Bool !((int32)lpInBuffer[4] == 0x0)> Input Buffer: <Bool lpInBuffer[0] == 0x0> _____

CVE-2018-19320, as discovered independently by our scanner

Results

- Evaluated on HEVD (Hacksys Extreme Vulnerable Driver)[3], with every vulnerability accounted for and reported
- Tested on **physmem_drivers**^[2] dataset
- Found 296 vulnerabilities
 - Tested on various drivers scraped off the internet
- Discovered and reported 2 **novel** vulnerabilities
- Resulted in 1 vulnerable driver being removed from download by consumers

Bug Type	Count
Stack overflow	8
Symbolic RDMSR	72
Symbolic WRMSR	72
Arbitrary read	70
Arbitrary write	68
Type confusion	2
Heap overflow	2
Memory disclosure	2
Total	296

Vulnerabilities discovered on physmem_drivers

Conclusion and Discussion

- Scanner can perform efficiently and find many vulnerabilities quickly in the drivers we obtained
- Rate of **false negatives** may be significantly **higher** in larger, more complex drivers
- While our scanner can detect standalone vulnerabilities easily, vulnerabilities that may chain into each other and require a complex chain of multiple IOCTLs to trigger may not be detected and reported
- Acceptable false negative rate for it to be used on a larger scale
- False positives are extremely rare
- Due to the nature of symbolic execution, every path in the driver has its full constraints represented and guarantees that the path is reachable during execution
- Comparing to existing state-of-the-art, our implementations are also **much faster**, with the average being around 19.45 seconds, while existing implementations take up to 30 minutes [4]
- Significant difference between scanning times is likely attributed to slower detection methods or optimisation methods not being implemented in other tools, which performs analysis with a symbolic IOCTL, preventing use of optimisations such as multithreading
- Potentially able to protect many systems from getting exploited by 0-day vulnerabilities by rapidly discovering and triaging potential vulnerabilities before malicious hackers
- Overall improvement upon previous state-of-the-art solutions

Future Work

- **Driver Frameworks Microsoft is currently promoting the use of Windows Driver Frameworks (WDF) to** create new drivers. Future work on our scanner could involve additional support to work with WDF
- Complex Vulnerabilities Detection of more complex vulnerabilities like type confusions involving heap
- objects/causing an integer overflow
- Proof-of-Concepts (PoC) Automatically generating PoCs, so that these vulnerabilities can easily be
- **reported** to the relevant developers to be fixed Patching - Automated patching system to update the drivers and remove the vulnerabilities
- Performance Optimisations More work could likely be done to cut the scanning time down, so that the
- scanner can be used on a larger scale to detect many vulnerabilities

Citations

[1] Gillis, A. S., & Tittel, E. (2024, August 5). What is a device driver? Search Enterprise Desktop.

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[2] Namazso. (n.d.). GitHub - namazso/physmem_drivers: A collection of various vulnerable (mostly physical memory exposing) drivers. GitHub. https://github.com/namazso/physmem_drivers/

[3] Hacksysteam. (n.d.). GitHub - hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Driver (HEVD) -Windows & Linux. GitHub. https://github.com/hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver

[4] Zeze-Zeze. (n.d.). GitHub - zeze-zeze/ioctlance: A tool that is used to hunt vulnerabilities in x64 WDM drivers. GitHub.

https://github.com/zeze-zeze/ioctlance